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I. INTRODUCTION
Air has no Residence, no Neighbor,
No Ear, no Door,
No Apprehension of Another
Oh, Happy Air!
Ethereal Guest at e’en an Outcast’s Pillow —
Essential Host, in Life’s fain, wailing Inn,
Later than Light thy Consciousness accost me
Till it depart, persuading Mine —1
In her poem, Emily Dickinson captures the mysteries of that
fundamental element of life that constantly surrounds us: air. Along
with water, air is indeed life’s “essential host.” It is precisely this
feature that requires our society to take actions toward monitoring
and protecting its quality, both for ourselves and future generations.
Dickinson’s poem also speaks directly to the trait which stands as the
most challenging obstacle to regulating air pollution. Air truly does
have “no residence, no neighbor.” It passes across borders
effortlessly, and it is this ambient quality of air that motivates states
to seek action against others on behalf of their citizens. This same
need, however, also suggests the necessity and importance of
uniform federal air pollution standards.
With the proliferation of scientific studies into climate change
and greenhouse gas emissions, air pollution stands today as an
increasingly important and controversial political, economic, and
social issue. In the modern era, concern has grown not only to
regulate pollution locally, but to protect citizens from emissions that

*Erica Bourdon is a second year student at Pepperdine University School
of Law. Erica graduated from the University of California at Irvine with a Bachelor
of Arts in Literary Journalism. This article would not have been possible without
the help of the wonderful NAALJ editors, most especially Elaine Ekpo. She would
also like to thank her father, for sharing his love of the environment and outdoors
which inspired this note and her fiance, Dan, for his continued love, support, and
grilled cheese sandwiches while she was writing.
1

EMILY DICKINSON, THE COMPLETE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON, 483
(Thomas H. Johnson, ed., 1976).
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originate elsewhere and have adverse effects on a national or global
scale.
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,2 the Supreme
Court takes up the issue of air pollution regulation and wrestles with
the question of whether individual states may bring suit in order to
abate greenhouse gas emissions emanating from stationary sources3
located in other states. This lawsuit constitutes “a new breed of
environmental enforcement, brought on by governmental officials
that are separate from the agencies historically delegated with
authority and empowered with expertise and resources to address
environmental issues.”4 The states brought suit on two separate
theories of nuisance—first, a state tort theory and second, a theory
based on federal common law.5 Proponents of upholding the federal
common law claim argue that “Americans deserve to be protected by
the old and reliable common law when the vicissitudes of politics
prevent competent protection.”6 They view the federal common law
nuisance claim as a way to “prod” Congress or the administrative
agency into action, arguing:
Just as the existence of divided and overlapping
government authorities creates opportunities for those
institutions to check and balance one another’s
overreaches, it also opens space for them to prod and
plead with one another when the danger instead is one
of government underreach.7
2

American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
“Stationary source” is a term of art defined as “any building, structure,
facility or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant.” 42 U.S.C. §
7411(a)(2) (2006). For example, a coal-fired power plant would be considered a
stationary source, whereas an automobile would be considered a mobile source.
These two types of sources fall under different regulatory schemes. See e.g.
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
4
KEVIN A. EWING, JASON B. HUTT, & ERIK E. PETERSEN, Enforcement
and Liability, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 67, 127 (19th ed. 2007).
5
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534.
6
John Wood, Easier Said Than Done: Displacing Public Nuisance When
States Sue for Climate Change Damages, 41 ENVTL. LAW REP. 10316, 10325 (Apr.
2011).
7
Benjamin Ewing and Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited
Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L. J. (forthcoming 2012)
3
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The interplay here between administrative agencies and federal
common law has far reaching consequences both in environmental
and administrative law. Where the Court’s decision in the present
case may be viewed on the one-hand as weakening state’s ability to
implement environmental laws by effectively eliminating one arrow
in their quiver of enforcement, it may also be seen as strengthening
or reinforcing the power of administrative agencies.
To reach their decision in American Electric Power Co., the
Court closely followed its previous analysis of the Clean Water Act.
After splitting 4-4 on the issue of standing,8 the Court proceeded to
(Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 224). Ewing and Kysar argue
that these tort theories of litigation and the availability of federal common law
claims to litigants serves as a system of “prods and pleas” counter to the system of
“checks and balances.” Id. While checks and balances work in the federal system
to limit the activities of the different branches of government, this “prods and
pleas” system would, according to the theory they present, work as a way for
different sections of the government to “push each other to action when changing
social conditions require it . . .” Id. They assert that “courts and other
governmental institutions should see calls for prodding and pleading not as
redundant and overreaching, but rather as structurally necessitated; not as
ahistorical or unoriginalist, but rather in keeping with the highest ideals and
aspirations of the Founders themselves.” Id. According to this principle, the suit
would act as a way to push the EPA into action where necessary according to the
states. Perhaps the Court in the present case felt that the settlement agreement
previously issued sufficiently served that purpose.
The authors recognize the special significance of these types of cases concerning
the welfare of the public-at-large saying:
The concern over third parties not before the court is particular to
the administrative law context, where courts are keen to avoid the
prospect of citizens using the power of judicial review to address
policy issues in the abstract or to pursue some generalized interest
in the proper administration of the law. This concern has less
bearing in the common law context as it is the judicial branch
itself that shapes and administers the relevant body of law.
Id. Essentially, what the authors are saying here is that because courts themselves
administer the common law, they are less hesitant to make rulings, whereas when
administrative law is involved, it is an agency rather than the court which oversees
the implementation of the law and therefore, the courts are reluctant to place their
own perspectives on the subject. This is the public policy concept behind
displacement.
8
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535.

Spring 2012

Happy Air

215

the merits of the case and its interpretation turns on Congress’s
delegation of rulemaking to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).9 The Court concluded that regulating emissions requires an
“informed assessment of competing interests” and that “[t]he Clean
Air Act entrusts such complex balancing to EPA . . . ,” rather than
federal judges who are without the “scientific, economic, and
technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of
this order.”10 Displacement of federal law occurs when a federal
statute or administrative agency regulation “governs a question
previously the subject of Federal common law.”11 Displacement may
be distinguished from preemption, which requires evidence of a
“clear and manifest purpose” by Congress to override a state law,
because it does not implicate the same concerns over the separation
of powers between the states and federal government inherent in our
federalist system.12 Based on this doctrine of displacement, the
Court’s ruling shrinks the realm of federal common law even further
to essentially eliminate it entirely, but does not reach the question of
preemption of the state tort law cause of action.13
Part II of this Note provides the scientific background and
historical context behind the Court’s ruling. Understanding this
decision requires a look not only at the history of federal common
law and administrative law, but the climate change debate, patterns in
environmental litigation and the history of the Clean Air Act itself.
Part III looks at the factual basis and procedural history behind
American Electric Power Co. Part IV analyzes the Court’s approach
to determining the issues of both (A) standing and (B) displacement,
and Part V discusses the impact of these determinations.
Specifically, Part V emphasizes the role of the Court’s decision on
administrative agencies and administrative law judges. Finally, in
Part VI, this Note concludes with an assertion that the displacement
of federal common law places an even greater responsibility on
administrative agencies to protect our health and welfare, particularly
our environment.

9

Id. at 2538.
Id. at 2539-40.
11
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981).
12
Id. at 316-17.
13
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
10
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Climate Change
Greenhouse gases are those gases that trap heat in the Earth’s
atmosphere.14 Carbon dioxide (CO2) is a greenhouse gas that occurs
both naturally in the atmosphere and as a result of human processes,
including the burning of fossil fuels and chemical reactions that take
place during certain production processes like the manufacturing of
cement.15 During a natural carbon cycle, the amount of CO2 emitted
into the atmosphere roughly cancels out the amount absorbed back
into the atmosphere or oceans.16 The exponential increase in human
activities such as deforestation and the burning of fossil fuels—oil,
coal, and gas—that has taken place since the Industrial Revolution
has caused the concentration of CO2 in the Earth’s atmosphere to

14

Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Climate Change - Greenhouse Gas
Emissions,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY
(Apr.
20,
2011),
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/index.html. See generally Science,
Climate Change – Science, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/index.html. Greenhouse gases occur
naturally in the atmosphere and allow solar radiation from the sun to remain within
our atmosphere, heating the Earth.
Id. Without the greenhouse effect,
“temperatures would be about 60ºF lower than they are now, and life as we know it
today would not be possible.” Id. The principal greenhouse gases emitted through
human activity are carbon dioxide (CO 2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and
the fluorinated gases (also called “F-gases” or high global warming potential gases)
which includes hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride. Id.
15
See Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 14. The four principal
greenhouse gases which occur both naturally and through human processes are
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and flourinated gases (hydrofluorocarbons,
perfluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride). Id.
16
Natural Sources and Sinks of Carbon Dioxide, Climate Change Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Apr. 15, 2011),
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/co2_natural.html. A natural carbon
cycle involves the exchange of carbon dioxide between sources and sinks. Id.
Sources include animal and plant respiration and volcanic eruptions, which
naturally admit carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Id. Sinks, such as plant
photosynthesis or oceans, then take in this carbon dioxide and continues the natural
cycle. Id. When this cycle works in balance, the total emission from sources and
the absorption from sinks is roughly equal. Id.
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greatly increase.17 The natural sinks that remove carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere are out paced by the increased emission into the
atmosphere.18 This increased concentration of greenhouse gases in
the Earth’s atmosphere results in the phenomenon known as climate
change or global warming.19
Research and debate about climate change began over a
century ago when scientist Joseph Fourier first hypothesized that the
earth’s atmosphere traps heat radiation.20 Despite Fourier’s early
research, it was not until 1859 that John Tyndall confirmed the
existence of greenhouse gases by discovering that CO2 in the
atmosphere does block heat radiation.21 Much of this early scientific
hypothesis and research into climate changes resulted from the study
of ice ages, including Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius’
calculations of the amount of CO2 necessary to significantly lower or
raise the global temperature.22 Numerous news reports as early as the
1920’s and 1930’s (particularly from the Arctic) claimed
temperatures were rising.23 In 1957, Roger Revelle, an ocean
chemist, and Hans Suess, a chemist and nuclear physicist, published
a paper overturning the long-held belief that the oceans absorbed the
17

Id. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the
concentration of carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere had expanded by 35% in
2005 since the Industrial Revolution of the 1700’s.
18
See U.S. Greenhouse Gas Inventory, Climate Change - Greenhouse Gas
Emissions,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY
(Aug.
5,
2011),
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/usgginventory.html.
19
See Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE
(2007),
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_re
port_wg1_report_the_physical_science_basis.htm.
20
Thomas Lin, Andrew C. Revkin, Jeff Roth, Lisa Tarchak and Spencer
Weart, Science and Politics of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/12/07/science/20091207_CLIMATE_TI
MELINE.html. Fourier made this hypothesis based on the study of ancient ice and
analogized his theory of how the earth retains heat radiation to “a box with a glass
cover.” Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. In 1896, Arrhenius believed that with the rate of emissions from
coal burning in the 1890’s, the effects of climate change would likely not be felt for
centuries. Id.
23
Id.
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excess CO2 being emitted.24 Their landmark paper, “regarded as the
opening shot in the global warming debates,” asserted that the oceans
could not absorb CO2 at the same pace as humans were emitting it
into the atmosphere.25 In the 1960’s, Suess linked this excess
emission of CO2 to fossil fuels.26
Just as the study of ice ages sparked the initial inquiries into
climate change, it also ignited controversy, particularly in the early
1960’s. In 1966, studies of core samples drilled from the sea bed and
ancient coral reefs offered concrete evidence that the ice ages
resulted from changes in Earth’s orbit rather than greenhouse gases.27
However, scientists continued to study the effects of increased
greenhouse gas emissions on temperature and weather patterns.28
Growing concern for the environment and a lack of understanding
and consensus around air and water pollution led President Richard
Nixon to create the EPA in 1970.29 Debate continued, with the EPA
24

Id.
Lin, supra note 20.
26
Id.
27
Id. Edward Lorenz suggested the possibility that “trivial astronomical
shifts” to the orbit of Earth may have brought on the ice ages. Id. Lorenz believed
that even the slightest change could have catastrophic effects on the climate. Id.
Shortly thereafter, on February 11, 1968, in an effort to better understand global
weather patterns and our planet’s history, scientists drilled 7,111 feet into the ice
beneath Antarctica. Id. The following year, the Nimbus 3 Satellite launched into
orbit to study and measure atmospheric temperatures. Id.
28
Id. The early 1970’s witnessed drastic changes in weather patterns
resulting in droughts and diminished crop production across the globe. Id. Climate
scientist concluded these alterations in weather patterns “posed a severe threat to
agriculture” and could result in “mass starvation.” Id. In 1975, a team of scientists
headed by Syukuro Manabe applied computer models simulating the rise in
temperatures resulting from increased amounts of CO2 in the atmosphere. Id.
29
James M. Naughton, Nixon Proposes 2 New Agencies on Environment,
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1970, at 1. President Nixon created the agency to combat
what he saw as “the tendency of statutory departments to allow their resource
development responsibilities to color their approach to environmental questions.”
Id. at 14. He stated that, “‘[b]ecause environmental protection cuts across so many
jurisdictions, and because arresting environmental deterioration is of great
importance to the quality of life in our country and the world, I believe that in this
case a strong, independent agency is needed.’” Id. On December 4, 1970, William
D. Ruckelshaus took office as the first Administrator of the EPA. See The
Guardian: Origins of the EPA, ENV’T PROTECTION AGENCY (Spring 1992),
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/publications/print/origins.html.
25
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and the National Academy of Sciences publishing conflicting reports
as to the severity and immediacy of concern over CO2 levels in
1983.30 Still seeking to reach a better understanding of the issue, the
international community, including the United States, created the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).31 The decade
of the 1990’s saw both the juxtaposition of increasing skepticism of
climate science in favor of economic growth set against ever more
dire warnings of a need to reduce man’s carbon footprint, particularly
by the IPCC.32 The new millennium ushered in an era of increased
media attention, scientific research and public concern over climate
change, with the international community negotiating treaties to
regulate emissions (the most well-known being the Kyoto
Protocol),33 some former skeptics in the scientific community
acknowledging data supporting climate change,34 and former VicePresident Al Gore receiving the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts
against global warming.35 Disagreement has not disappeared,
30

See Lin, supra note 20.
Id.
32
Id.
See
also
Assessment
Reports,
IPCC,
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml
(last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
33
The Kyoto Protocol legally obliges signatory countries in the
industrialized world to cut emissions of greenhouse gases under international law.
United Nations, Making those first steps count: An Introduction to the Kyoto
Protocol,
FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/6034.php (last visited
Feb. 9, 2012). While originally adopted in Japan in 1997, the accord did not take
effect until 2005. Id. It only binds developed countries, not developing nations
and was never adopted by the United States. Id.
34
Perhaps most notably, University of California, Berkeley physicist and
former global warming skeptic Richard Muller undertook a study of the earth’s
surface temperature. Seth Borenstein, Skeptic finds he now agrees global warming
is real, YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 31, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/skeptic-finds-nowagrees-global-warming-real-142616605.html. Specifically, Muller focused his
research on “examin[ing] two chief criticisms by skeptics. One is that weather
stations are unreliable; the other is that cities, which create heat islands, were
skewing the temperature analysis.” Id. He found a 1.6 degree increase in
temperatures from the 1950s. Id. After undertaking the study, he concluded that
“Greenhouse gases could have a disastrous impact on the world.” Id.
35
In 2007, the Nobel Foundation awarded former vice-president Al Gore
Jr. and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change the Nobel Peace Prize “for
their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made
31
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however, as the scandal that became known as “climategate36” led
some to distrust the scientific community and concern for the state of
the economy led others to call for less governmental regulations in an
effort to promote industry.37
B. Clean Air Act (CAA)
While water pollution had long been considered a federal
problem, prior to the 1960’s many viewed air pollution as a state or
local matter.38 At that time, most of the laws regulating air quality
were nuisance-based state law ordinances.39 States derived the
ability to regulate environmental pollution through their
constitutional police powers, which allowed them to take measures in
order to protect the health and welfare of their citizens; most declined
climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to
counteract such change.” The Nobel Peace Prize 2007, NOBELPRIZE.ORG,
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/ (last visited Feb. 3,
2012).
36
In November of 2009, hundreds of e-mails and documents hacked from
a server at the University of East Anglia in Britain caused many to believe climate
scientists had knowingly and intentionally misled the general public about the level
of impact of human activities on climate change. Andrew C. Revkin, Hacked EMail Is New Fodder for Climate Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/21/science/earth/21climate.html. The e-mails
include discussions between scientists about “using a statistical ‘trick’ in a chart
illustrating a recent sharp warming trend,” in analysis of tree-ring data and
thermometer readings. Id. One of the scientists implicated in the correspondence,
Michael Mann of Pennsylvania State University responded to the allegation by
explaining that “dropping the use of the tree rings was never something that was
hidden, and had been in the scientific literature for more than a decade. ‘It sounds
incriminating, but when you look at what you’re talking about, there’s nothing
there, . . .’” Id.
37
See e.g. William Fulton, Do Environmental Regulations Hurt the
Economy?, GOVERNING (Mar. 2010), http://www.governing.com/columns/ecoengines/Do-Environmental-Regulations-Hurt.html.
38
ARNOLD W. REITZE, STATIONARY SOURCE AIR POLLUTION LAW 5
(2005). See also J. Philip Bromberg, How to Comply with the Clean Air Act, in
CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 23 (1983). In addition to the earlier development of
technology to monitor and control water pollution, water’s role as a carrier and
spreader of contagious disease, as well as its use as a pathway of interstate
commerce landing it within the purview of the Commerce Clause, granted to water
earlier federal involvement in regulation than air. Id.
39
Id. at 6.
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to exercise this power, however, and in the few states that did, laws
took the form of local zoning ordinances.40 Most localities directed
these ordinances primarily against smoke.41 Historically, there has
40

Id. at 6-7. Hadacheck v. Sebastian provides one early example of a
local attempt to regulate air pollution. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915). In 1915, the City of Los Angeles encompassed an area of 107.62 square
miles with 75% devoted to residential use. Id. at 406. The city implemented a
zoning ordinance making it “unlawful for any person to establish or operate a
brickyard or brickkiln [sic], or any establishment, factory, or place for the
manufacture or burning of brick within . . .” a three square mile area of the city. Id.
at 404, 406. Plaintiff, Hadacheck, operated a brick making facility on his property
which rested within the three square miles mentioned in the ordinance. Id. at 404.
Defendant, the Los Angeles chief of police, took plaintiff into custody after his
conviction of a misdemeanor for violating the ordinance. Id. at 404. Plaintiff
asserted the law constituted an unlawful taking of his property without
compensation and greatly diminished the value of his property in violation of the
14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 407. Plaintiff appealed the denial
of his writ of habeas corpus all the way up to the United States Supreme Court,
who affirmed the findings of the California Supreme Court in upholding the
validity of the ordinance. Id. at 414. The Supreme Court found the exercise of the
city’s police power valid in prohibiting the burning of bricks as “fumes, gases,
smoke, soot, steam, and dust arising from petitioner’s brick-making plant have
from time to time caused sickness and serious discomfort to those living in the
vicinity.” Id. at 408. This case illustrates an early attempt to regulate air quality
based on concerns for the health of the citizens living in the municipality.
41
See Bromberg, supra note 38, at 25. Chicago was the first city to pass
municipal legislation governing the quality of air in 1881, followed by Cincinnati
shortly after. Id. at 26. Pittsburg passed its first regulations of air quality as early
as 1985, followed by regulations in the city of Boston in 1901. Id. at 25. The
regulation passed by the Board of Health of the City of Boston read in part:
No substance in any way liable to be distributed or blown about
by wind or air currents shall be sieved, screened, agitated or
otherwise handled or exposed in any street or public place, nor
elsewhere in such a manner that particles or portions of such
substances are scattered, blown or otherwise pass into or upon
any such street or pubic place or into or upon any inhabited
buildings. This shall not apply to the delivery of coal, provided
suitable precautions for dampening are taken . . . No carpets, rugs,
mats or similar articles shall be . . . dust particles or portions of
said articles from being blown, scattered or otherwise passing
from the place where such beating or cleaning is carried on. Id.
Oregon was the first state to adopt a comprehensive control on air quality in 1952,
three years earlier than the first federal legislation on the topic. Id. at 26. In many
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been a strong interplay between land use and environmental
regulations.42 Over time, and as public concern regarding air quality
in urban centers grew, some state governments did eventually enact
comprehensive emission control ordinances before the federal
government intervened in the regulation of air pollution.43
The federal government did not play a role in the regulation
of air pollution until the 1960s, urged on by the proliferation of coalburning power plants in response to the growth in population and
industry after WWII, further hastened on by an environmental
catastrophe in Donora, Pennsylvania known today as “killer fog.”44
On October 27, 1948 weather conditions and extreme air pollution
from the American Steel & Wire Company and the Donora Zinc
Works (both operated by the U.S. Steel Company) just outside the
city of Donora, Pennsylvania formed a deadly combination killing

cities during this period, including Los Angeles as it became concerned with the
growing effects of smog, the municipal agencies’ budgets were larger than that of
the state agencies. J. Philip Bromberg, How to Comply with the Clean Air Act, in
CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 23, 23-27 (1983). In 1967, California’s state budget
for its agency dealing with air quality was $2,400,000 compared to Los Angeles’
municipal agency budget of $3,800,000 to address air pollution issues. Id. at 26.
42
Id. at 19.
43
Id. at 8. See also R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS:
THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 25-8 (1983).
44
Bromberg, supra note 38, at 26. See also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN &
WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981). Donora, a Pennsylvania
town just 37 miles outside of Pittsburgh and situated close to both the Donora Zinc
Works and U.S. Steel Corp. steel and wire plant, marked the site of one of the
nation’s most memorable environmental disasters. Id. at 152. On October 29th,
1948, an unusual yellow smog enveloped the town likely caused by extraordinarily
high concentrations of what subsequent researches have posited to have been
Sulfur dioxide (SO2). Id. As a result of the smog, in addition to the twenty people
asphyxiated, 43% of the town suffered from some form of adverse health effects.
Id. Then in December of 1952, a similar fog descended upon London resulting in
4,000 deaths in a two-week period. Id. at 152. “No pollutant monitors were
present in Donora during the incident; a single monitoring site in London recorded
extraordinarily high daily concentrations of SO2 and particulates . . . . Other
episodes have occurred in the world’s major cities since 1952, but none has been as
serious.”
Id. See also 1948 Killer Smog Triggered Pollution Control,
WWW.DONORASMOG.COM,
http://www.donorasmog.com/newsarticles_files/article1948killersmog.htm
(last
visited Feb. 9, 2012).
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twenty people and leaving half the city of 14,000 ill.45 Six days later,
rain finally came and cleared out the smog.46 Researchers attribute
the catastrophe to “an unusual weather inversion – a pocket of warm,
stagnant air – that sat over the valley . . . . Underneath what was
essentially a lid on the valley were sulfuric acid, nitrogen dioxide and
other poisonous gases, including fluoride, that would normally rise
into the atmosphere.”47 The United States Steel Company denied
responsibility, calling the smog “an act of God.”48 Many credit the
national attention gained by this environmental disaster as leading to
the passage of the 1970 Clean Air Act.49 In 2008, the town of
Donora opened a museum to remember the lives lost in the smog
with the slogan: “Clean Air Started Here.”50
Federal involvement in air pollution regulation began with
passage of a string of several congressional acts and evolved into the
CAA we have today as administered by the EPA and its
administrative law judges, and as interpreted by the Supreme Court.51

45

Donora Smog Held Near Catastrophe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1948, at
26. Dr. Mills from the University of Cincinnati oversaw a house-to-house
canvassing of Donora in the months following the smog in order to collect data in
an attempt to better understand the catastrophe. Id. He reported twenty human
deaths, as well as over 800 animals killed by the deadly smog. Id. “Of the 7,670
residents now questioned, 3,212 reported serious effects on that ‘fatal’ night; 603 of
these were treated by physicians and 277 others begged unsuccessfully for such
aid, many of them receiving treatment from city firemen and Red Cross workers.”
Id. Dr. Mills also asserted that many of the residents who did not report any
negative effects from the smog refused to do so in fear of losing their employment
at the zinc plant. Id. This assertion was disputed by others, however, including the
president of the Board of Health. Id.
46
Sean D. Hamill, Unveiling a Museum, a Pennsylvania Town
Remembers the Smog That Killed 20, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/02/us/02smog.html.
47
Id.
48
See Donora Smog Held Near Catastrophe, supra note 43.
49
See Hamill, supra note 46.
50
Id.
51
These congressional acts being the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955,
69 Stat. 322, the Clean Air Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 392, and the Motor Vehicle Air
Pollution Control Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 992. See Melnick, supra note 43, at 27.
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While Congress passed the first Clean Air Act in 1963, originally
administered by the U.S. Public Health Service,52
Over the past four decades, the [CAA] has evolved
from a set of principles designed to guide states in
controlling sources of air pollution . . . to multiple
levels of pollution control requirements (the 1970,
1977 and 1990 amendments to the act) that the federal
government implements by regulations and that the
states administer and apply.53
The 1990 Amendments significantly impacted the
implementation of air pollution controls as they shifted the focus
from a “command-and-control” approach to a “market-control”
approach.54 It is under this approach that the regulation of emissions
from stationary sources falls and the issue in the present case arises.
The 1990 Amendments also provide for permitting and greatly
expanded the authority of the EPA in regulating air pollution.55 The
Supreme Court has since interpreted the CAA in several ways,
including its decision in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency, discussed infra, where the Court found that “greenhouse
gases . . . qualify as ‘air pollutants’ within the meaning of the
governing Clean Air Act provision,” and therefore fall under the
regulatory authority of the EPA.56

52

History of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Nov.
16, 2010), http://epa.gov/oar/caa/caa_history.html.
53
F. WILLIAM BROWNELL, Clean Air Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
HANDBOOK 231 (Sullivan ed., 19th ed. 2007).
54
Id.
55
Id. The 1990 Amendments to the CAA “[e]stablished permit program
requirements”, “[e]xpanded and modified provisions concerning the attainment of
National Ambient Air Quality Standards”, “[e]xpanded and modified enforcement
authority”, and “[e]stablished a program to phase out the use of chemicals that
deplete the ozone layer.” History of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY (Nov. 16, 2010), http://epa.gov/oar/caa/caa_history.html.
56
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2532-33 (citing Massachusetts
v. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29).
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C. Environmental Litigation
The difficulties facing respondents in this case come as
familiar ground in environmental litigation.
Plaintiffs have
historically struggled to overcome two barriers: the requirements of
standing and justiciability.57 However, respondents in the present
case face a third issue, displacement. This relationship between
environmental concerns and these areas of the law continues to grow
and evolve, as illustrated by the present case.
The Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins58
disavowed the existence of a federal common law, however, just
thirty-four years later in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee
I),59 with Justice Douglas writing for a unanimous court, held, “when
we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there
is a federal common law.”60 Milwaukee I went even further in
speaking to the current issue by stating, “It may happen that new
federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the
field of federal common law of nuisance. But until that comes to
pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the
suits alleging creation of a public nuisance . . . .”61

57

Kevin A. Gaynor, Benjamin S. Lippard, and Margaret E. Peloso,
Challenges Plaintiffs Face in Litigating Federal Common-Law Climate Change
Claims, 40 ENVTL. L REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10845 (Sept. 2010).
58
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In what began as a
personal injury suit filed in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, Justice
Brandeis, writing for the majority, overturned the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. 1 (1842), which allowed federal courts deriving jurisdiction from diversity of
citizenship to exercise independent judgment in interpreting the common law.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 71. Finding the doctrine to have both political and social defects
in that it “rendered impossible equal protection of the law,” the Supreme Court in
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins declared, “There is no federal general common law.” Id.
at 74-78.
59
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) [hereinafter
Milwaukee I].
60
Id. at 103 (adopting the holding of the tenth circuit in Texas v. Pankey,
441 F.2d 236 (1971)).
61
Id. at 107. While the Court in Milwaukee I dealt specifically with water
pollution and the application of the tort of public nuisance in that respect, they
extended the concept to include air quality as well as water quality because of their
ambient natures. Id. at 93.
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Congress saw fit to amend the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act in 1972 and established a new system requiring a permit
for the discharge of any pollutants into the nation’s waterways.62 The
Supreme Court then granted certiorari to hear once again the claims
of Illinois and Michigan against the sewage treatment plants in
Milwaukee in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan (Milwaukee
II).63 The Court found these amendments and the delegation of their
implementation to the EPA disallowed the invocation of federal
common law as a remedy.64 They clarified their earlier holding in
Milwaukee I to establish that federal common law may only be
created if not doing so would deny the plaintiffs any forum in which
to protect their interests.65 The Court explained its rationale as
follows: “Not only are the technical problems difficult—doubtless
the reason Congress vested authority to administer the Act in
administrative agencies possessing the necessary expertise—but the
general area is particularly unsuited to the approach inevitable under
a regime of federal common law.”66
The possibility of displacement of federal common law by the
passage of laws or regulations left open by the Court in Milwaukee I
and exemplified in Milwaukee II came to fruition with the passage of
the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the myriad lawsuits accompanying
it.67 After Congress amended the CAA in 1977, the Court decided
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., a
hallmark of administrative law.68 The Court held that the EPA as the
62

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 310 (1981)
[hereinafter Milwaukee II]. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972 gave the EPA power to regulate under this law and maintained any prior
requirements established by the EPA as requirements for obtaining a permit. Id. at
311. Permits were then issued either by state agencies that qualified or by the EPA
itself. Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 325.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
See Melnick, supra note 43. Melnick contends that between 1970 and
1980, federal courts had heard “hundreds of cases dealing with air pollutants” and
issued rulings “profoundly affecting national environmental policies” to fill in the
void left open by the current legislation. Id. at 1.
68
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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administrative agency delegated to implement the provisions of the
CAA stood in a better position to enforce these regulations than a
federal judge.69
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, decided
in 2006, mirrors some of the same issues and concerns in the present
case and, as discussed infra, controls the Court’s reasoning.70 In that
case, several states brought suit against the EPA for failure to
regulate emissions from motor vehicles under the CAA.71 The Court
found that Massachusetts had standing because of its property
interests in shoreline which would be threatened by the rise of sea
levels caused by global warming, and this global warming stemmed
from the emission of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere by
automobiles.72 The Court further found that, “EPA has refused to
comply with this clear statutory command” to regulate greenhouse
gases.73 The Court determined that the EPA had offered no
“reasonable explanation” as to why it had not regulated greenhouse
gases and directed them on remand to either base its inaction or
action in regulating carbon dioxide on the statute.74
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency, the EPA entered into a settlement
agreement and publically stated in part:
Under the proposed settlement agreement, EPA will
sign by July 26, 2011, and will transmit to the Office
of the Federal Register within five business days, a
proposed rule under section 111(b) that includes
standards of performance for GHGs for new and
69

Id. at 845. The Court focused much of its analysis on the political
questions stating, “federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between
competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones.” Id. at 866. Chevron
stands for the notion that where an administration agency has undertaken to
regulate in a certain area as delegated to do so by Congress, federal judges sit in no
position to overrule the agency’s legitimate policy determinations.
70
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2006).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 533.
74
Id. at 534-35.
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modified EGUs that are subject to 40 CFR part 60,
subpart Da. EPA will also sign by July 26, 2011, and
will transmit to the Office of the Federal Register
within five business days, a proposed rule under
section 111(d) that includes emissions guidelines for
GHGs from existing EGUs that would have been
subject to 40 CFR part 60, subpart Da if they were new
sources. Under the proposed settlement agreement
EPA will take final action with respect to the proposed
rule no later than May 26, 2012. The proposed
settlement agreement provides that EPA's fulfillment
of its obligations under the agreement shall result in a
full and final release of any claims that State and
Environmental Petitioners may have under any
provision of law to compel EPA to respond to the
Court's Remand Order with respect to GHG emissions
from EGUs.75
It is this settlement agreement, issued by the EPA between the time
respondents filed suit in the present case and the Supreme Court
issued its decision, which exemplifies the current state of
enforcement of the CAA. A new ruling regarding the emission
standards of carbon dioxide will be promulgated in mid-2012 and
perhaps the area of environmental law will evolve once again to
accommodate these regulations.
III. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Respondents consist of two separate groups bound together
by a common threat.76 In 2004, eight states and the city of New York
75

Proposed Settlement Agreement, Clean Air Act Citizen Suit, 75 Fed.
Reg. 82392 (Dec. 30, 2010) (emphasis added).
76
Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir.
2009). California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Wisconsin, and the City of New York filed a complaint against American
Electric Power Company, Inc., American Electric Power Service Corporation,
Southern Company, the Tennessee Valley Authority, Excel Energy, and Cinergy
Corporation in 2004. Id. Shortly thereafter in July of 2004, The Open Space
Institute, Inc., The Open Space Conservancy, Inc., and the Audubon Society of
New Hampshire filed a complaint against the same six plaintiffs. Id. Respondents
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filed suit against petitioners, the five largest emitters of carbon
dioxide in the United States; respondent land trusts filed a parallel
suit shortly thereafter.77 Collectively, the respondent states represent
the interests of more than 77 million citizens and “their related
environments, natural resources, and economies.”78 Petitioners
annually emit 650 million tons of carbon dioxide, constituting a
quarter of all emissions from the domestic power sector and 10% of
total domestic anthropogenic CO2 emissions.79 This carbon dioxide
then works to trap heat in the Earth’s atmosphere resulting in the
climate trend know as global warming, during which temperature
levels rose approximately .75 to 5 degrees Fahrenheit between the
years 1900 and 2005.80 The EPA projects this trend of rising
temperatures will continue, predicting an increase in temperature of
around four to five degrees by the year 2100.81
“[W]armer average temperatures, later fall freezes and earlier
spring thaws, and the decrease in average snowfall and duration of
snow cover on the ground” are some of the injuries suffered by
respondent states as a result of the increase in global temperatures
caused by the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere.82 The respondent states estimate costs in the
billions of dollars to respond to these problems caused by global
named American Electric Power Service Corporation as a defendant to the original
lawsuit, however, they are not an emitter of carbon dioxide, but a management
service for American Electric Power Company, Inc. Id.
77
Id.
78
Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
79
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534. This constitutes 2.5% of
the world’s total emissions from human activities. Id.
80
American Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 314.
81
Id. The EPA’s estimate of global temperature increase seems optimistic
in relation to other estimates. Respondent land trusts cite reports predicting a much
bleaker outcome. They cite to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
who estimates global temperatures will have risen approximately 2.5 to 10.4
degrees Fahrenheit between 1990 and 2100. Id.
82
Id. at 317. The respondent states also assert they will suffer myriad
future injuries from petitioners’ unrestrained emitting of carbon dioxide. Id. at
317-18. These future injuries include: increased smog leading to respiratory issues,
substantial coastal erosion, salinization of marshes and water supplies, prolonged
heat waves resulting in a higher frequency of heat related illness and death,
increased wildfires and the disruption of ecosystems. Id. at 318.
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warming and assert a direct causal link between petitioner’s
emissions of carbon dioxide and their injuries.83 Respondent land
trusts suffer slightly different injuries than the respondent states that
represent the general public.84 The Open Space Institute (OSI) and
Open Space Conservancy (organized to carry out the purposes of the
OSI) together hold land and easements valuing approximately $56
million and the Audubon Society of New Hampshire (Audubon)
owns over 6,000 acres of land for conservation.85 Global warming
from greenhouse gases causes permanent damage to the land held by
these trusts by diminishing their value through the destruction of
wildlife habitat, for example.86 Because these pieces of land were
specifically selected by the trusts for purchase based on their
aesthetic as well as ecological value, the harm caused by global
warming will directly diminish their value and frustrate their purpose
of conservation and scientific study.87
Together, the plaintiff states and land trusts sought relief in
Federal District Court in the Southern District of New York
requesting the court place a cap on the carbon dioxide emissions of
defendants and then reduce the capped amount annually under a
theory of a federal common law tort of nuisance and alternatively
under a state tort theory.88 The district court dismissed the case in
2005 on a motion for summary judgment declaring the issue a nonjusticiable political question.89 Plaintiffs appealed to the Second

83

Id. at 317. Further, California suffered a reduction in its mountain
snowpack, leading to a decrease in available drinking water obtained from the
summer runoff into stream flows. Id.
84
Id. at 318. The three land trusts are non-profit organizations formed for
the purpose of acquiring and preserving “ecologically significant and sensitive
properties for scientific and educational purposes,” as well as for the enjoyment of
the public at large. Id. The land trusts own a variety of different properties with
unique environmental significance, including nature sanctuaries, wildlife preserves
and open spaces. Id.
85
Id.
86
American Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 317. Respondent land trusts
assert for example that the rise in coastal waters will inundate some of their
properties and cause irreversible damage to forests, marshes and other wildlife
habitats. Id. at 318.
87
Id. at 318-19.
88
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2532.
89
Id. at 2534.
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Circuit, and the Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the lower
court.90 In doing so, the court of appeals relied heavily on Milwaukee
I,91 which confirmed the existence of a federal common law
concerning air and water92 and found the EPA’s lack of regulation on
the matter dispositive.93 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on
December 6, 2010.94
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, with
Justice Alito filing a concurrence in which Justice Thomas joined.95
She begins with a brief overview of the Court’s analysis and
determination in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,
and the EPA’s response to the decision of that case.96 Following a
cursory overview of the procedural history, Justice Ginsburg then
briefly addresses the issue of standing before delving into a detailed
analysis of the displacement of federal common law.97
A. Standing
Justice Ginsburg devotes only a small portion of her opinion
to addressing the petitioners’ assertion that the federal courts lacked
authority to adjudicate the respondents’ claims, although it has
historically appeared as a major hurdle to plaintiffs in environmental
cases. Article III of the Constitution, which governs federal courts,
limits their jurisdiction to “cases” and “controversies.”98 This

90

Id.
Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 91.
92
Id. at 103 (holding that “[w]hen we deal with air and water in their
ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law”).
93
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535.
94
American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010).
95
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2531. Justice Alito, with
whom Justice Thomas joins, concurs in the judgment and the analysis assuming,
arguendo, the Court previously analyzed and interpreted the CAA in
Massachusetts v. EPA—in which both dissented—correctly. Id. at 2540-41.
96
Id. at 2532-33.
97
Id. at 2533-40.
98
U.S. Const. Art. III, Sect. 2.
91
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language has previously been interpreted to require “questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed
as capable of resolution through the judicial process,” thereby
precluding all political questions.99
The Court’s 5-4 split over this issue in a similar case just four
years earlier illustrates this point.100 With only eight Justices taking
part in the decision of the present case,101 Justice Ginsburg notes,
“Four members of the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs
have Article III standing under Massachusetts . . . . Four members of
the Court, adhering to a dissenting opinion in Massachusetts . . . or
regarding that decision as distinguishable, would hold that none of
the plaintiffs have Article III standing.”102
For many hoping the present case would bring clarity to the
issue of standing in environmental suits, the Court’s equally divided
split simply extends the shaky groundwork already in place, rather
than building a concrete base for plaintiffs to rely on in future suits.
Allotting only one paragraph to even mentioning this threshold issue
leaves much in this area to question and does not fully resolve the
issue. The Court entirely relies on their decision in Massachusetts,

99

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). In determining whether a
private citizen met the requirements of standing simply by virtue of being a
taxpayer, the Court grappled with the issues of both standing and justiciability as a
subset of the doctrine of standing. Id. at 99. The Court found that the taxpayerappellants in that case had sufficiently established standing through a showing that
use of taxpayer funds through Congress’s power to spend for the general welfare in
that case violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment. Id. at 103.
100
Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2006). In
2007, Massachusetts asserted standing to bring suit against the EPA for failure to
regulate carbon emissions from vehicles based on their unique position of owning
several miles of coastline which they asserted would be diminished by a rise in sea
level during global warming directly caused by the release of carbon emissions into
the atmosphere. Id. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found Massachusetts
to have standing to bring the suit. Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
joined in his majority opinion. Id. Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia
filed dissenting opinions with which Justice Thomas and Justice Alito joined both,
arguing that in fact, Massachusetts and the other petitioners lacked standing to sue
because they did not suffer a personal or direct injury. Id. at 535-60.
101
Justice Sotomayor took no part in the decision or consideration of this
case. See American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
102
Id. at 2535.
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but gives no explanation as to why or how they came to their
conclusion. Perhaps they analogized California’s depleting snow
packs with Massachusetts’s declining shoreline, but they do nothing
to clarify that in the opinion.103
The changing composition of the Court may impact the issue
of standing in suits under the CAA and may well have played a part
in the present case. Since the Court decided Massachusetts back in
2007, Justice Stevens and Justice Souter retired and Justice
Sotomayor and Justice Kagan succeeded them. This change in the
composition of the Court may have some effect on the decision of
standing since both Justices Stevens and Souter found Massachusetts
to meet the case or controversy requirement in 2007.104
The equally divided split and Justice Ginsburg’s superficial
treatment of the questions of standing and justiciability leave open
uncertainty for future plaintiff’s attempting to bring suit in federal
court.
Justice Alito, who dissented in Massachusetts, wrote
separately to concur in just two sentences.105 His shift from
dissenting in Massachusetts to concurring in the present case at first
glance seems to suggest he has abandoned his previous rationale and
shifted allegiances, however, his use of the term “for the sake of
argument” suggests otherwise.106 The cryptic phrasing of Justice
Alito’s dissent and the terse treatment of the issue by Justice
Ginsburg leave the door open for future dissention over the matter in
the federal courts and does nothing to clarify the Court’s previous
findings in Massachusetts.

103

Id. at 2535.
Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 501 (2006).
105
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540-41. Justice Alito, joined
by Justice Thomas, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, wrote, “I
concur in the judgment, and I agree with the Court’s displacement analysis on the
assumption (which I make for the sake of argument because no party contends
otherwise) that the interpretation of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, adopted
by the majority in Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 . . . (2007), is correct.”
Id.
106
Id.
104
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B. Displacement
Justice Ginsburg begins her discussion of displacement by
stating, “‘There is no federal general common law,’ Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins. . . famously recognized. In the wake of Erie,
however, a keener understanding developed.”107 She then goes on to
address the exception to the Erie rule which allows for federal
common law in areas “‘within national legislative power,’ one in
which federal courts may fill in ‘statutory interstices,’ and, if
necessary, even ‘fashion federal law.’”108 She agrees with petitioners
that environmental protections fall into the category of this
exceptions, however, she asserts that “[r]ecognition that a subject is
meet for federal law governance, however, does not necessarily mean
that federal courts should create the controlling law.”109
After recognizing the existence of a federal common law and
placing air pollution within the purview of such a law, Ginsburg
addresses the alternative possibilities of which law should apply to
the regulation of carbon emissions from stationary sources.110 She
first addresses the possibility of applying state common law to the
issue, but determines such as inappropriate based on the interstate
characteristics of the pollution.111 She distinguishes the cases
respondent states and land trusts cite as precedent for their assertions
of a tort theory of state nuisance law as instances which permitted
states to file suits challenging “activity harmful to their citizens’
health and welfare.”112
Here, the Court deals with a case not of permitting a state to
sue in order to benefit its citizens’ health or welfare, but to abate “any
and all manner of pollution originating outside its borders.”113

107

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); American Elec.
Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535.
108
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535 (citing Erie, 304 U.S. at
421-22).
109
Id. at 2536.
110
Id.
111
Id. Justice Ginsburg writes, “And where, as here, borrowing the law of
a particular State would be inappropriate, the Court remains mindful that it does not
have creative power akin to that vested in Congress.” Id.
112
Id.
113
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535.
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Further, the case presents an issue of first impression to the Court by
dealing with not only a state as a plaintiff, but whether a political
subdivision, in the case of New York City and private citizens, the
land trusts, may invoke the federal common law of nuisance to abate
pollution.114
After addressing federal common law, Justice Ginsburg next
turns to the issue of public nuisance laws. She asserts that the court
has “recognized that public nuisance law, like common law
generally, adapts to changing scientific and factual circumstances.”115
Once she groups federal common law and state nuisance laws
together, Justice Ginsburg next dismisses the entire idea of them as
one of academic pursuit only.116 She finds that, “[a]ny such claim
would be displaced by the federal legislation authorizing EPA to
regulate carbon-dioxide emissions.”117
Justice Ginsburg rests her analysis of displacement of federal
common law on the Court’s holding in Milwaukee II, which found
that once Congress acts on an issue previously governed by federal
common law, the need for that common law disappears.118 She
offers that, “The test for whether congressional legislation excludes
the declaration of federal common law is simply whether the statute
‘speaks directly to [the] question’ at issue.”119 By this analysis, she
analogizes the enactment of the Clean Water Act with the CAA and
holds that the CAA and the actions it authorizes for the EPA to take
“displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of carbondioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”120 She
outlines the procedures to be taken for enforcement under the act and
reinforces the Court’s previous finding that CO2 qualifies as an air
pollutant under the CAA.121 Once the EPA lists categories of
stationary sources to be controlled, each state then issues its
performance standards and if the states or the EPA fail to enforce the

114

Id.
Id. at 2536.
116
Id. at 2537.
117
Id.
118
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
115
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standards they have set, the CAA “permits ‘any person’ to bring a
civil enforcement action in federal court.”122
Justice Ginsburg devotes the remainder of her opinion to
reconciling the issue of the timing of the present case and the
displacement of the federal common law. After determining that the
CAA displaces the federal common law, she offers that a plaintiff
might have recourse against the EPA for not acting upon its
mandate.123 She previously stated that because the EPA entered into
a settlement agreement in which the agency agreed to set standards
for fossil-fuel power plant’s greenhouse gas emissions, the federal
common law has therefore been displaced.124 The issue here is that
the present litigation began before the settlement agreement existed,
although many of the parties to the settlement agreement are also
parties to the present case.125 Here the Court diverges from the
holdings of the Second Circuit, which found displacement only to
occur at the time of actual rulemaking.126 She addresses this issue by
stating, “The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the
decision whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from
power plants; the delegation is what displaces federal common
law.”127 She primarily bases her argument on the idea of agency
expertise above that of individual federal judges making case-by-case
determinations and the complexity of the delegated requirements in
the CAA.128 She determines that these two ideas “cannot be
reconciled with the decision making scheme” established by
Congress.129 Justice Ginsburg solidly bases this analysis on the

122

Id. at 2537-38. (citing § 7604(a)).
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538. Justice Ginsburg
writes, “If EPA does not set emissions limits for a particular pollutant or source of
pollution, States and private parties may petition for a rulemaking on the matter,
and EPA’s response will be reviewable in federal court.” Id. This was the case in
Massachusetts, where petitioners sought to require the EPA to regulate emissions
from automobiles as a required under the CAA. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2006).
124
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 2539-40.
129
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
123
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Chevron Doctrine, but it leaves unanswered the question, during
these dead waiting periods, what recourse do states and private
citizens have against harm caused by those not yet regulated by the
administrative agency delegated to do so?130
V. IMPACT
A. Federal Common Law
Erie refuted the existence of federal common law, but
Milwaukee I reserved it only when dealing with water and air in their
ambient states. Unlike other areas of the law, environmental issues,
specifically those dealing with water and air, can be seen as
inherently national since, as respondents argued in this case,
pollution originating in Alabama effects the health and quality of life
of citizens in California, as well as the value of their personal
property, even though the two states are not contiguous. The
Supreme Court recognized in Milwaukee II, the creation of federal
common law in matters of water pollution arose from their concern
that without such laws plaintiffs had no other forum in which to
preserve their interests.131
As explained in Milwaukee II, when deciding whether to
apply federal statutory or common law the Court’s analysis begins
“with the assumption that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to
articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of
federal law.”132 Justice Scalia noted in Milwaukee II that “when
Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision

130

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467
U.S. 837 (1984). In one of the most influential cases dealing with administrative
law, the Supreme Court upheld the EPA’s definition of “statutory source” for
purposes of regulation as per the CAA. Id. It established a two-part test by which
a court must interpret an agency’s construction of a statute. First, the court must
determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,
and second, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.” Id. at 842-43.
131
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 325.
132
Id. at 317.
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rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise
of lawmaking by federal courts disappears.”133
Prior to the decision in the present case, courts and academics
believed that unlike the Clean Water Act and the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, the CAA failed to displace federal common
law in the area of air pollution control because it did not regulate all
the potential sources of air pollution.134 However, following Justice
Ginsburg’s reasoning in the present case, the CAA does displace all
federal common law claims regarding air pollutants. The present
decision makes clear that we need no longer determine whether
federal common law applies after the passage of the CAA. Justice
Ginsburg plainly states, “it is an academic question whether, in the
absence of the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions the Act authorizes,
the plaintiffs could state a federal common law claim for curtailment
133

Id. at 314.
Id. See also Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., 582 F. 3d. 309,
378 (2009). In their analysis of the instant case, the Second Circuit reasoned that
“no Supreme Court case has held that the CAA has displaced federal common law
in the area of air pollution” and disagreed with the district court in New Jersey’s
finding that congressional findings calling the law “comprehensive,” “equated the
CAA with the FWPCA” and thus, automatically finding federal common law
preempted without further analysis. Id. at n.47; United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532
F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982). See also John Wood, Easier Said Than Done:
Displacing Public Nuisance When States Sue for Climate Change Damages,41
ENVT’L L. REP. 10316 (Apr. 2011). Wood argues that, “involvement on the part of
the judiciary and the states is more justified in the context of climate change . . .
because of the degree of uncertainty pervading the issue . . .”and therefore, “the
option value of environmental control mechanisms increases.” Id. at 10323. He
analogizes the role of the judiciary to a baseball game, offering:
134

The judiciary is the pinch hitter (via nuisance liability), in case
EPA promises to hit a foul (by promulgating a regulatory
scheme that exceeds authority under the CAA), and in case
Congress promises to bunt (via legislation that compromises
too much and fails to mitigate climate change risks); and the
judiciary is the backstop, in case either branch strikes out (that
is, fails to regulate carbon emissions); and the judiciary is the
umpire, as to the adequacy of the executive and congressional
measures (federal common-law protection is the equitable
standard against which executive and congressional schemes
are evaluated).
Id. at 10325.
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of greenhouse gas emissions because of their contribution to global
warming.”135
Even though at the time of the Court’s holding, the EPA had
yet to issue standards regarding the emission of CO2 from statutory
sources, the remedy of federal common law suit still sits unavailable
to respondents, despite the fact that they filed their suit prior to the
settlement agreement in which the EPA agreed to regulate such
sources. Further, Justice Ginsburg later offers states or private
parties the option to petition the EPA for a rulemaking on the matter
if these parties feel the EPA sits outside of compliance with the
CAA.136
The Court’s decision in the present case eliminates the federal
common law of nuisance altogether. With the holding in Milwaukee
I reserving federal common law only to areas of air and water in their
ambient states, and the Court later finding that “the federal common
law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely pre-empted
by the more comprehensive scope of the FWPCA [Federal Water
Pollution Control Act] . . . ,”137 the action effectively no longer
existed for water pollution. The holdings in the present case
eliminate the federal common law nuisance action for abatement of
air pollution. These two decisions taken together abolish both areas
in which such a claim of nuisance might have been made, thereby
removing it all together in environmental law.138
Since the holding in the present case, it has been applied by
several district courts,139 as well as the Seventh Circuit in Michigan
135

American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537.
Id. at 2538.
137
Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453
U.S. 1, 22 (1981).
138
Federal common law may still exist as an avenue for litigants in areas
exclusively governed by federal law, such as bankruptcy, admiralty or antitrust.
See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
139
See e.g. Amigos Bravos v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 6:09-cv00037-RB-LFG, 2011 WL 3924489 (D. N. M. Aug. 3, 2011).; Union Pac. R. Co. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 8:08CV336, 2011 WL 6337599 (D. Neb. Dec.
19, 2011); Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Locke, No. C 10-04790 CRB,
2011 WL 3443533 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011); U.S. v. Eme Homer City Generation
L.P., No. 2:11-cv-19, WL 4859993 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2011); Genesee Cnty. Emp.
Retirement Sys. v. Thornburg Mortg. Sec. Trust, No. CIV 09-0300 JB/KMB, 2011
WL 5840482 (D. N.M. Nov. 12, 2011).
136
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v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.140 In that case, plaintiffs brought
suit under a theory of the federal common law of nuisance based on
alleged mismanagement by defendants of the Chicago Area
Waterways System.141 They asserted that such mismanagement
would allow invasive carp to enter the ecosystem of the Great Lakes
damaging the ecology of the lake system and threatening “billiondollar industries that depend on the existing ecosystem.”142 Applying
the reasoning of American Electric Power Co., the Seventh Circuit
found that defendants, along with administrative agencies and
experts, had launched “a full-scale effort to stop the carp from
reaching the Great Lakes,” and promised to continue taking further
steps to avoid the potential ecological disaster.143 The court found
that even without the “formal legal regime that caused the Supreme
Court to find displacement . . . we have something close to it.”144
The Seventh Circuit found displacement of the common law based on
the regulatory scheme and denied plaintiff’s injunction.
The application of the holding by the Seventh Circuit
demonstrates the impact of the displacement analysis and its
bolstering of administrative power. In that case, rather than one
Congressional act or one agency’s rulemaking, the court found that
several agencies taking steps (or promising future steps) to combat a
perceived harm was sufficient to justify displacement of the federal
common law of nuisance. This illustrates the growing reliance on
and authority of administrative law in our environmental regulatory
system.
The closing of the door to federal common law suits for
plaintiffs wishing to abate air pollution may weaken the role of
federal judges in the area of environmental law, but on the other
hand, it strengthens the role of the administrative law judges. The
present case takes an entire genre of litigation—air pollution—and
places it outside the realm of federal judge determination and solely
into the hands of the administrative agency to which Congress
delegated the task. Still, depending on the future course of the EPA’s
Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10-3891, 2011 WL
3836457 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2011).
141
Id. at *1.
142
Id.
143
Id. at *2.
144
Id.
140
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regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, perhaps, the door will open
again someday. For now, however, the decision in this case firmly
establishes the EPA as the deciding voice in the regulation of air
quality and deeply erodes the power of the states in an area they
traditionally controlled.
B. State Nuisance Tort
The Court declines to take up respondents’ state law claims,
as did the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 145 Justice Ginsburg
writes, “the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, inter alia,
on the preemptive effect of the federal Act.”146 The respondents
sought relief under the state tort law of nuisance in the source state of
the emissions.147 The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a public
nuisance as “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public.”148 The use of public nuisance to abate air pollution
in the form of smoke dates back as far as King Edward III in
England.149 Nuisance law today takes the form of statutes, common
145

American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
Id.
147
Id.
148
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1977). The Restatement goes
on to give three factors to consider in determining whether the interference is
unreasonable:
146

(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference
with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the
public comfort or the public convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance,
or administrative regulations, or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has
produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor
knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the
public right.
At common law, public nuisance covered a broad range of conduct including the
keeping of diseased animals, the shooting of fireworks in the street, or even the
operating of a house of prostitution. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. b
(1977).
149
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. a (1977). At this time,
public nuisance was thought of as an “infringement of the rights of the Crown,”
and was documented to have “extended to the invasion of the rights of the public,
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law or a mixture of both depending on the state.150 For example,
California defines nuisance as “[a]nything which is injurious to
health . . . ”151 and a public nuisance as “one which affects at the
same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage
inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.”152
Observers have noted a resurgence in the use of public
nuisance in the area of environmental law,153 but some courts have
been reluctant to rule on such a theory. Recently, in North Carolina
v. Tennessee Valley Authority,154 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated, “The ancient common law of public nuisance is not ordinarily
the means by which such major conflicts among governmental

represented by the Crown, by such things as . . . smoke from a lime-pit that
inconvenienced a whole town.” Id. This tort can be distinguished from private
nuisance because it does not require interference with the enjoyment of one’s land.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. h (1977).
150
Emily Sangi, The Gap-Filling Role of Nuisance in Interstate Air
Pollution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 479, 502 (2011).
151
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2011). The statute offers a nonexhaustive list of what might constitute a nuisance including, “the illegal sale of
controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to
the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or
property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner,
of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park,
square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.” Id.
152
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 2011).
153
F. William Brownell, State Common Law of Public Nuisance in the
Modern Administrative State, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 34, 34 (2009-2010).
154
North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010).
The state of North Carolina brought suit against the Tennessee Valley Authority
operating plants in Alabama, Tennessee and Kentucky. North Carolina passed a
law requiring public utilities operating coal-fired generator units to reduce their
emissions to more stringent levels than those required by the EPA pursuant to the
CAA. Subsequently, North Carolina became aware of emissions arising from
Tennessee Valley Authority plants located in other states moving eastward across
its borders. They brought an action seeking injunction against these coal-fired
power plants. The Fourth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Int’l
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), that the court must apply the nuisance
law of the source state, and the claim failed under both Alabama and Kentucky law.
They argued finding otherwise would undermine the regulatory scheme established
by Congress and the EPA.
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entities are resolved in . . . American governance.”155 The Fourth
Circuit articulated the chief concern associated with the use of
nuisance to promulgate air standards.156 It warned that upholding
such a ruling “would encourage courts to use vague public nuisance
standards to scuttle the nation’s carefully created system for
accommodating the need for energy production and the need for
clean air. The result would be . . . a confused patchwork of
standards, to the detriment of industry and the environment alike.”157
Dissemination of standardized regulations by a federal agency
eliminated the problem of a “patchwork of standards” by creating
uniformity.
Those critical of the CAA, however, believe rather than
creating uniformity, it actually incentivizes states to literally blow
their pollution elsewhere through its regulatory scheme of National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and State Implementation
Plans (SIPs).158 They view these standards as “underinclusive . . .
because a state could meet the applicable ambient standards but
nonetheless export a great deal of pollution to downwind states
because the sources in the state . . . are located near the interstate
border.”159 A state initiated public nuisance suit against another state
155

North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 301 (4th Cir.
2010) (quoting North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 593 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815
(W.D.N.C. 2009)).
156
North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir.
2010).
157
Id.
158
F. William Brownell, Clean Air Act in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
HANDBOOK 231, 232-42 (Sullivan ed., 19th ed. 2007). The CAA addresses
ambient air pollution by setting NAAQS for certain pollutants which endanger the
public health. Id. These are set levels of certain elements in the air which are to be
reviewed and revised every five years and creates a substantial challenge to the
EPA’s effective implementation of the CAA. Id. The pollutants regulated include
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, ozone and
lead. Id. These NAAQS are enforced upon the states in the form of SIPs. This
grants authority to each state to regulate emissions from sources within its borders
in order to meet the NAAQS. SIPs have numerous requirements and must be
updated within three years of any new or updated NAAQS. Id.
159
Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental
Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2350 (June 1996). Arguing that empirical
data illustrates the increased use of tall stacks after the 1970 enactment of the CAA,
Revesz asserts:
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exhibiting such behavior may act as a way to fill in the regulatory
gap.
As discussed supra, application of the CAA often mirrors that
of the Clean Water Act, and the American Electric Power Co. Court
has deemed this to be the same when dealing with the idea of public
nuisance.160 Both statutes contain nearly identical savings clauses
and the Court interpreted the Clean Water Act’s savings clause in
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,161 as “not preclud[ing]
aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the
law of the source State.”162 The present case extends this holding to
the CAA.163 By doing so, the Court’s decision leaves this door ajar
as a potential future avenue for states’ grievances by not decisively
taking up the issue on the merits.164 Consequently, public nuisance
action in the source state may continue to play a viable role in
reducing ambient air pollution by providing states inundated with
external pollution an avenue outside of the administrative law context
in which to address grievances.
C. Role of the Administrative Law Judges
In “[o]ne of the most significant changes in civil
enforcement,” the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act granted

The best evidence that states do indeed encourage sources to use
tall stacks can be found in the provisions of the SIPs adopted by
at least fifteen states . . . . These SIPs allowed sources to meet the
NAAQS by using taller stacks rather than by reducing emissions.
In those SIPs, the permissible level of emissions was an
increasing function of the height of the stack. If the stack was
sufficiently high, the effects would be felt only in the downwind
states and would therefore have no impact on in-state ambient airquality levels. Through these measures, the states created strong
incentives for their firms to externalize the effects of their sources
of pollution. Id. at 2351-52.
160

American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540.
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
162
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540 (quoting Int’l Paper Co.
v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 497).
163
Id.
164
Id.
161

Spring 2012

Happy Air

245

the EPA the ability to enforce administrative penalties through the
Office of the Administrator rather than referring all cases to the
Department of Justice and the court system.165 Modeled after the
Clean Water Act, the Amendments limit jurisdiction of an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to matters in which “the total
penalty sought does not exceed $200,000 and the first alleged date of
violation occurred no more than 12 months prior to the initiation of
the administrative action . . . ,” unless the EPA Administrator and the
Attorney General agree to a higher penalty.166 Throughout the course
of enforcement, ALJs may serve as neutrals during an Alternative
Dispute Resolution process or fact-finders and decision makers
during litigation.167 The Environmental Appeals Board reviews
appeals of ALJ decisions.168 The Administrative Procedure Act
governs these proceedings.169 The inclusion of this change in the

165

F. WILLIAM BROWNELL, Clean Air Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
HANDBOOK 231, 290 (Sullivan ed., 19th ed. 2007). The CAA also authorizes
criminal prosecutions of those who knowingly violate the statute. Id. at 291. Since
the 1990 Amendments to the CAA, criminal penalties have increased to five years
imprisonment and a fine of $250,000 per day for individuals and $500,000 per day
for corporations. Id. Criminal penalties may also be incurred for lower standards of
mens rea including negligence. Id. at 291-92. The Department of Justice oversees
the prosecution of these criminal penalties through the courts, rather than before an
ALJ.
166
42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (2006).
167
U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Citizen’s Guide, OFFICE OF ADMIN. L.
JUDGES (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/oalj/orders/citizensguide.pdf. The EPA offers mediation services free of charge in which an ALJ,
appointed by the Office of Administrative Law Judges, serves as the neutral. U.S.
Envtl. Protection Agency, About the Office of Administrative Law Judges (Jan. 30,
2012), www.epa.gov/oalj/about.htm. If no resolution can be reached through
mediation a different ALJ will be assigned to the case for litigation. Id.
This system in which ALJs serve both as neutrals and as adjudicators has been
critiqued by those who question their ability to truly serve as neutrals while on the
payroll of the EPA and by those who understand the difficulty of one person
playing both roles. While the ALJ who serves as the mediator for a case will not
ultimately be the same person appointed to oversee the adjudication and make a
determination, the EPA ALJs do wear both hats. This requires them not only to be
well-versed in the environmental laws in which they administer and administrative
procedures, but also the art of mediation and alternative dispute resolution.
168
Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/oalj/.
169
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1966).
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1990 Amendments grants the EPA greater autonomy to enforce the
CAA and a heightened ability to quickly reach settlement
agreements.170
The Court’s decision in the present case, precluding federal
courts from promulgating standards for greenhouse gas emissions,
limits future enforcement to three avenues: EPA initiated suits either
before an ALJ or district judge depending on the penalty amount,
state public nuisance actions as discussed supra, or citizen suits.171

170

See Brownell, supra note 165, at 290.
42 U.S.C. § 7604. This code section, which authorizes citizen suits to
enforce the provisions of the Clean Air Act reads in pertinent part:
171

(a) Authority to bring civil action; jurisdiction
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person
may commence a civil action on his own behalf—
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii)
any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent
permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who is
alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged
violation has been repeated) or to be in violation of (A) an
emission standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a
standard or limitation,
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of
the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter
which is not discretionary with the Administrator, or
(3) against any person who proposes to construct or constructs
any new or modified major emitting facility without a permit
required under part C of subchapter I of this chapter (relating to
significant deterioration of air quality) or part D of subchapter I of
this chapter (relating to nonattainment) or who is alleged to have
violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation has been
repeated) or to be in violation of any condition of such permit.
....
(c) Venue; intervention by Administrator; service of complaint;
consent judgment
(1) Any action respecting a violation by a stationary source of an
emission standard or limitation or an order respecting such
standard or limitation may be brought only in the judicial district
in which such source is located.
(2) In any action under this section, the Administrator, if not a
party, may intervene as a matter of right at any time in the
proceeding. A judgment in an action under this section to which
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While states may still find standing to bring suit under a state
nuisance tort scheme, as discussed above, the emphasis of
enforcement on the EPA and the placement of air pollution
regulations within the administrative law context gives great
responsibility and influence to the ALJs charged with overseeing
prosecution and litigation under the CAA.
Data reported for EPA’s fiscal year of 2011 illustrates the
importance of and emphasis placed on ALJs in administering the
CAA. In the agency’s Enforcement and Compliance Annual Results,
the EPA reported $19 million in penalties assessed under the CAA by
ALJs.172 That number rose steeply from $6 million assessed in both
2009 and 2010, an increase of more than 310%.173 Additionally, the
EPA issued 1,735 final administrative penalty orders and 1,324
administrative compliance orders.174 The EPA reported it “focuses
the United States is not a party shall not, however, have any
binding effect upon the United States.
(3) Whenever any action is brought under this section the plaintiff
shall serve a copy of the complaint on the Attorney General of the
United States and on the Administrator. No consent judgment
shall be entered in an action brought under this section in which
the United States is not a party prior to 45 days following the
receipt of a copy of the proposed consent judgment by the
Attorney General and the Administrator during which time the
Government may submit its comments on the proposed consent
judgment to the court and parties or may intervene as a matter of
right. Id.
The statute grants to citizens the ability to bring suit against the EPA Administrator
or against polluters not being prosecuted by the Administrator. While the statue
grants jurisdiction to the district courts and not to the ALJs, the statute still grants
considerable power to the administrative agency by requiring the administrator
receive notice of the suit, not allowing judgment to be entered without fulfillment
of the notice period requirement and, most importantly, by allowing intervention by
the administrator to become a party to the suit. Id.
172
FY2011 Enforcement & Compliance Annual Results, Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Dec.
8,
2011),
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2011/resultschartsfy2011.pdf.
173
Id. The total amount of administrative penalties levied by the EPA in
fiscal year 2011 was $48 million, the majority being violations of the CAA,
followed by the Clean Water Act. Id.
174
Id.
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on larger administrative cases,” rather than civil judicial cases, with
only 182 civil judicial conclusions in 2011.175
The numerical and monetary data illuminates the pivotal role
ALJs play in administering and upholding the EPAs regulations
under the CAA. Orders issues by ALJs differ from holdings by
federal courts in both the amount that can be litigated and the appeals
process. While ALJs may preside over only cases in which the fine
does not exceed a certain amount prescribed by legislation, federal
courts may oversee adjudication of much larger claims. These dual
avenues of enforcement allow the EPA flexibility in prosecuting
offenders whose crimes carry a lesser fine without forcing the agency
through the often expensive and time consuming process of litigation
in the federal courts. An administrative law hearing provides a more
efficient and expeditious alternative to prosecute companies or
persons violating environmental laws. Additionally, all appeals of
orders issued by ALJ’s go through the Environmental Appeals Board
rather than through the appellate court system. With the Court’s
holding ushering in an end to federal common law, and the limited
scope of availability for state nuisance tort claims, the ALJs may well
become the keystone of the CAA.
VI. CONCLUSION
While American Electric Power Co. settles the questions
regarding the federal common law of nuisance, it does little to clarify
the issue of standing, which remains both a source of confusion and
an obstacle to plaintiffs in environmental suits. The Court’s decision
also leaves open the avenue of state tort causes of action, particularly
nuisance, for states seeking abatement of cross-border air pollution.
On the surface, it may seem as though the displacement of federal
common law weakens the cause of environmentalist, but when
viewed through the lenses of administrative law, the opposite seems
true.
Rather than weakening environmental law, American Electric
Power Co. may be read as strengthening administrative law. Indeed,
the mission of the EPA is to ensure that “all Americans are protected

175

Id. at 10.
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from significant risks to human health and the environment . . .” and
that “environmental protection contributes to making our
communities and ecosystems diverse, sustainable and economically
productive.”176 By consolidating the power to achieve these goals in
one independent administrative agency it allows for uniform
standards across the country, a streamlined method of enforcement,
and the application of the law by specialized experts in the field,
rather than piecemeal application by federal judges.
The ruling in American Electric Power Co. eliminates the
federal common law cause of action for nuisance at the present time,
but leaves open the possibility of revival in the future if the current
regulatory scheme changes or new issues arise in climate change
science that are not fully addressed by the CAA and EPA’s system of
enforcement. The test laid out by the Court provides guidance for
future decisions analyzing displacement, directing them to determine
whether federal statutes and administrative regulations speak directly
to the issue for which plaintiffs seek redress.
As the controversy surrounding climate change continues and
the battle over greenhouse gas regulations, particularly CO2
emissions from industrial sources, marches on as a political topic of
debate, the determination in the present case reaffirms the Court’s
prior decision in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency
that the CAA authorizes the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases.177
Although the Court hesitates to openly endorse a particular view of
climate change,178 its determination that Congress intended the EPA
to regulate greenhouse gases and that the EPA has ultimate authority
in the area, seems to acknowledge the issue as a real and pressing
matter requiring action.
The Court’s decision marks a step forward both for
environmental law and administrative law. It endorses both climate
change regulation and administrative authority. American Electric
Power Co. entrusts to administrative agencies and administrative law
176

Our Mission and What We Do, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY
(June 8, 2011) http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/whatwedo.html.
177
American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2532; Massachusetts. v. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
178
“The Court, we caution, endorses no particular view of the complicated
issues related to carbon-dioxide emissions and climate change.” American Elec.
Power 131 S. Ct. at n.2.
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judges the responsibility of protecting that precious commodity
essential to all life, yet despite so much research, still shrouded in
controversy and mystery: air. Even in light of the Court’s decision
and the EPA’s future regulations, as long as skeptics exist in the
scientific community and greenhouse gas emissions remain a topic of
political discussion, air will remain:
A Little road not made of man,
Enabled of the eye,
Accessible to thill of bee,
Or cart of butterfly.
If town it have, beyond itself,
‘Tis that I cannot say;
I only sigh,—no vehicle
Bears me along that way.179
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